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W. S. HATCH CO. 
~om District Court of Davis County 
~e Parley E. Norseth, Presiding 
TATEMENT OF FACTS 
; statement of facts is accurate in some 
contains several conclusions of law, argu-
rs wholly immaterial to the issues involved. 
ull paragraph on page 3 of appellant's 
transactions between the parties prior to 
2 
the agreement dated October 1, 1961, all of which are 
outside the issues between the parties. 
The last paragraph of appellant's statement of facts 
on page 6 is a conclusion of law and one of the issues 




THE PAYMENT OF $1,567.50 BY RESPOND-
ENT TO THE UTAH-IDAHO SECURITY FUND 
WAS NOT COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES AND WAS MADE PUR-
SUANT TO APPELLANT'S UNLAWFUL DEMAND. 
On the 16th of October, 1961, appellant and re-
spondent entered into a collective bargaining agreement 
(plaintiff's Exhibit A). Article XX, Section 2, provides: 
"Effective October 1, 1961, the Company shall 
contribute to a jointly administered trust fund the 
sum of $16.50 per month for each regular em-
ployee covered by this agreement, who has worked 
eighty ( 80) hours or more in the preceding month 
and thereafter shall continue to pay $16.50 for 
each such employee who works eighty ( 80) hours 
or more during each preceding month, for the 
duration of this agreement." (emphasis added) 
Article XXXI, provides: 
"This agreement shall be effective October 16, 
1961, th'rough September 30, 1964. " 
The contract by its own terms covers a period of 
36 months. It was effective October 1, 1961, and expired 
September 30, 1964. The contract was not renewed. 
(Tr.57) 
Appellant has admitted in its statement of facts that 
respondent made 36 payments beginning on October 9, 
1961, through September 14, 1964, pursuant to the terms 
of the agreement. (See Exhibit 1.) 
Appellant's witness, Dean F. Corbett, admitted that 
the first payment dated October 9, 1961, covered eligibili-
ty for benefits for the month of October 1961; that the 
37th payment which is in dispute (defendant's Exhibit 4) 
covered eligibility for benefits for the month of October 
1964, a month not covered by the agreement. (Tr. 90, 91) 
There is no ambiguity in the agreement. By its own 
terms it is effective October 1, 1961, and expires Sep-
tember 30, 1964, a period of 36 months. 
The only reason that it is necessary to consider a 
month prior to the effective date of the contract (to-wit, 
September 1961 ) is to determine the eligibility of em-
ployees for coverage during the month of October 1961. 
Accordingly, the month of August 1964 covers the eligi-
bility requirements for insurance coverage in September 
1964, the last month covered by the contract. 
As stated, on September 14, 1964, respondent made 
payment of $1,584.00 based on hours worked in August 
1964 for eligibility and benefits in September of 1964. 
This was the 36th and final payment under the agree-
ment. 
4 
In October 1964, the appellant Teamsters Union 
went on strike. (Tr. 65 ) 
On December 17, 1964, Mr. Fulmer H. Latter, the 
Secretary-Treasurer of appellant Teamsters Local Union 
No. 222, made demand on behalf of appellant that re-
spondent make an additional payment representing in-
surance coverage for the month of October 1964. (See 
defendant's Exhibit 3.) 
Respondent made payment (Exhibit 4) pursuant to 
this demand. It was made under duress because of the 
strike and the difficulties then existing between the par-
ties. (Tr. 64-67) 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT RECEIVED NO BENE F IT 
FROl\1 SUCH PAYMENT. 
Appellant contends that even if it is in error in its 
contention that the payment was covered by the contract, 
that it nonetheless was a voluntary payment for which 
Hatch received full benefits. 
As indicated, the payment was not voluntary but was 
made under duress. 
Certainly, respondent Hatch Co. received no benefit 
from this payment. The employees were on strike. There 
is no evidence of record that any benefits were paid, even 
to the striking employees. Under no circumstances did 
any benefits accrue to respondent Hatch Co. 
5 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED THE DEFENSE 
RAISED IN ITS POINT NO. III. 
In its Point III the appellant contends that the judg-
ment is in error because the payment was in fact made 
to the Utah-Idaho Teamsters Security Fund and not to 
the appellant. 
Appellant's complaint was filed in May of 1965 (R. 
5). Paragraph 4 of respondent's counterclaim alleges: 
"On, or about December 17, 1964, plaintiff, 
Teamsters Local Union No. 222, made an unlaw-
ful demand upon defendant for payment of 
$1,567 .50 purportedly covering payments required 
under Article XX of the aforementioned agree-
ment. Said demand indicated that the payment 
was to cover the month of September 1964." 
(R. 7) 
In its reply, respondent admitted the allegations contained 
in paragraph 4 except that it denied that the demand 
made upon plaintiff was unlawful. ( R. 9) 
Paragraph 5 of respondent's counterclaim alleges: 
"Pursuant to said demand, defendant paid plain-
tiff, Teamsters Local Union No. 222, the sum of 
$1,567.50 relying upon said plaintiff's representa-
tion that the payment was to cover the month of 
September 1964." ( R. 7) 
In its reply, respondent stated: 
"Answering paragraph 5 of the counterclaim, a~­
mit that pursuant to said demand defendant paid 
plaintiff Teamsters Local 22'2, the sum of $1,567.-
6 
50, but alleges that it does not have information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the balance of the 
allegations therein contained and therefore dem 
the same." (R. 9) · 
Thus, by the pleadings themselves, appellant has 
admitted that the payment made by respondent was made 
to plaintiff, Teamsters Local No. 222. 
Furthermore, the pretrial order resolved the issues 
between the parties. The pretrial order ( R. 14) sets forth 
only four issues. Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 4 involves the plain· 
tiff's complaint and are not the subject of this appeal. The 
only issue reserved covering the counterclaim is contained 
in paragraph 3 which is as follows: 
"3. Is the final payment made by defendant to 
the Fund for all of Hatch's employees for the 
month of September or October 1964." 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro· 
cedurc provides in part: 
"The Court shall make an order which recites the 
action taken at the conference, the amendments 
allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made 
by the parties as to any of the matters considered, 
and which limits the issues for trial to those not 
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; 
and such order when entered controls the subse· 
quent course of the action, unless modified at the 
trial to prevent manifest injustice." 
"Where the pretrial order or report purports to state 
the issue to be tried, the trial should be confined to such 
issues, and other issues should be eliminated from con· 
sideration." (See Annotation 22 ALR 2d, 599, 603.) 
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In McCarthy vs. Lerner Stores Corporation ( 1949), 
U. S. District Court - District of Columbia, 9 FRD 31, 
the Court stated: 
"One of the chief purposes of pretrial procedure, 
and the principal usefulness of the pretrial order, 
is to formulate the issues to be litigated at the trial. 
The parties are bound by the pretrial order. They 
may not later inject an issue not raised at the pre-
trial conference. Otherwise, the primary objective 
of the pretrial procedure would be defeated." See 
also Fowler, et al, vs. Crown-Zellerbach Corpora-
tion CCA 9th Circuit ( 1947) 163 Fed. 2d, 772. 
Not only did appellant fail to raise this issue until 
the morning of trial, but it affirmatively admitted that 
payment was made to it. The issue was of course, omitted 
from the pretrial order. 
The check in question was made payable to the 
"Teamsters Pension Trust Fund." It was deposited to the 
account of Utah-Idaho Teamsters Security Fund. (Tr. 
64) It was, however, paid to appellant's nominee pur-
suant to appellant's demand. 
That this is factually so is apparent by reference to 
defendant's Exhibit No. 3, the demand letter made by 
appellant and not by the Utah-Idaho Teamsters Security 
Fund. 
The last paragraph of that letter states: 
"Referring to Section 5 of Article XX in our labor 
agreement we hereby notify you that these delin-
quent health and welfare contributions must be 
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received by the Utah-Idaho Teamsters Security 
Fund on or before December 22, 1964. Your fai]. 
ure to comply with this request will require us to 
take appropriate legal action to collect these con. 
tributions and the W. S. Hatch Co. will also be 
sued for court costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
as set forth in the lagor agreement." (emphasis 
added) 
Section 5 of Article XX (plaintiff's Exhibit A) merely 
provides that delinquencies in health and welfare pay· 
ments entitle the Union and employees to the same rights 
as specified in Section 4 of Article XXI covering pension 
fund delinquencies. Section 4 of Article XXI specifically 
gives the Union the right to take any legal action it sees 
fit to collect such delinquencies after first giving seven 
days' written proper notice to the Company. It is ap· 
parent, therefore, that the demand for the additional 
health and welfare payment which is the subject of de-
fendant's counterclaim was made by the Union and not 
by the Trust Fund, pursuant to specific authority con· 
tained in the labor agreement giving them the right to 
take legal action and collect such delinquency along with 
attorney's fees. Certainly, this right cannot be exercised 
without a concomitant obligation in the event it is abused, 
as it was here by making an unlawful demand pursuant 
to the authority contained in the agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The payment of $1,567.50 was paid pursuant to ap· 
pellant's unlawful demand; it was for a period not cov· 
9 
cred by the agreement and was paid to appellant's nomi-
nee, Utah-Idaho Teamsters Security Fund, in accordance 
with the collection machinery set up in the agreement. 
The judgment is fully supported by the evidence and 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK K. BOYLE 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 
W. S. Hatch Co. 
